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Abstract
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the
competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I
show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus
between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.
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1.  Introduction
A general problem in the theory of political competition is that of explaining the
phenomenon of candidates or political parties taking different policy positions on an
issue rather than converging (as in the familiar Hotelling-Downs model) to a common
policy position. Since clearly, if two candidates choose policies to maximize their
probabilities of election, then when all is said and done, the candidate who realizes that
his probability of election is less than that of his opponent has an incentive to duplicate
the policy stance that his opponent has taken. Would such duplication of policy
positions not result in the candidate who has revised this position having a fifty percent
chance of electoral success? The question thus arises as to how, in principle,
polarization of policy positions can be explained.
Political polarization is a spatial phenomenon. Within the spatial theory of political
competition there are three strands of literature which one can draw on to explain
political polarization. These three literatures focus on different groups of political
actors. The key groups of actors in any spatial model of political competition are the
candidates running for public office, the voters who vote for the candidates, and the
interest groups who contribute to the candidates￿ election campaigns. Since polarization
of policy positions is a consequence of the candidates￿ behavior, modeling the decision
calculus of the candidates is an indispensable ingredient of models portraying policy
polarization. With respect to the two remaining groups of key actors, the analyst has a
choice. One modeling strategy is to focus on the interaction between the competing
candidates and the voters, and to neglect the interest group activities. This is the
modeling strategy which underlies the voting theory of political competition. A second
strand of literature focuses more on the interaction between the candidates and the
activities of the interest groups. In these models the behavior of the voters is relegated
to the background by portraying voting behavior with some kind of contest success
function. The models belonging to this strand of literature constitute the traditional
lobbying theory of political competition. This theory is thus characterized by a certain
lack of micro-foundation as far as voting behavior is concerned. An emerging third
strand of literature attempts to overcome this shortcoming by incorporating all three
groups of key actors in a single model. All of the models belonging to this third group
portray in more or less detail how incompletely informed voters can be influenced in an
election campaign. The dividing-line between the traditional and the second-generation
lobbying models of political competition is, however, not clear-cut and depends on what
one accepts as a primitive building block of a micro-foundation. If the black box of the2
traditional contest-success function is simply replaced by another black box, for
example by an ad hoc specification of an information-transmission technology, not
much is gained.
Sophisticated post-Downsian voting-theory models which explicitly deal with the
polarization issue date back to the contributions by Wittman (1983) and Bernhardt and
Ingberman (1985). This strand of literature is nicely surveyed in Fiorina (1999). A more
extensive survey of the extensive literature on voting theory of political competition is
to be found in Osborne (1995).
The political-polarization model by Austen-Smith (1987) is often regarded to represent
a predecessor of the incomplete-information lobbying theory of political competition.
The model indeed combines elements of voting and lobbying theory, but the model￿s
structure is not completely consistent. Another early contribution to this literature is
Mayer and Li (1994). The bulk of the second-generation literature on lobbying models
of political competition is, however, only a few years old and still in the process of
initial growth.1 This is the reason why I focus in this paper on the traditional lobbying
theory of political competition.
This paper is not meant to represent an exhaustive survey of the literature on the
traditional lobbing theory of political competition. The objective is rather to provide a
simple tool kit for applied political economists by presenting the modeling strategies
used in this literature to portray political polarization. I have, as a consequence, made no
attempt to cite all the papers that employ the presented modeling strategies. Since the
surveyed modeling strategies have been applied to a large number of economic policy
fields, such an attempt would, in any case, not have been very illuminating.
                                               
1 Papers which belong to this second-generation  literature include Besley and Coate (2000a), Besley and
Coate (2000b), Coate (2001), Felli and Merlo (2000), Glazer and Gradstein (2001), Ortuno-Ortin and
Schultz (2001), Potters, Sloof and van Winden (1997), Prat (2000), Prat (2001), and Schultz (2002).3
2.  The Vanilla Model
A model which portrays the pre-election interaction between interest groups and
candidates for public office consists essentially of the objective functions of the players
and a contest success function specifying the election-campaign technology. The
channel through which interest groups influence the election outcome is usually
identified with the provision of campaign contributions. The following contest success
function which is standard in the rent-seeking literature nicely captures this nexus in a




























In this equation π denotes the probability of the first candidate￿s winning the election,
and ci (i=1,2) the campaign contributions collected by candidate i. The parameter β≥ 1
measures the relative efficiency of the first candidate￿s campaign. For the time being,
we assume β=1 and two interest groups j (j=1,2). The two interest groups choose
campaign contributions to maximize their expected utility specified as
(2) 2 1 2 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( j j j j j L L Q G Q G V − − − + = π π ,
where Gj denotes the utility derived by interest group j from the policy Qi∈[ 0,1]  proposed
by candidate i, and Lji denotes interest group j￿s contribution to i￿s campaign.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that the candidates do not steal any of the
contributions to increase their personal income: L1 1i i+L2i=ci, for i=1,2.
 The two competing candidates choose policy platforms Qi with a view to maximize
their expected utility
(3) ) , , , , ( 2 1 2 1 c c Q Q U U i i π =
The starting point of our analysis is the standard (vanilla) assumption that the candidates
maximize their respective probabilities of winning the election:4
(3a) π π − = = 1 2 1 U and U
If the candidates make their policy pronouncements simultaneously, and the interest
groups then simultaneously respond to these policy pronouncements by providing
utility-maximizing campaign contributions, we are faced with a simple two-stage game
that can easily be solved via backward induction to obtain the subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
In the second stage of the game, i.e. in the lobbying sub-game, the policy
pronouncements Q1 and Q2 are given. Let the first interest group prefer candidate 1 and
the second interest group candidate 2: G1(Q1)>G1(Q2) and G2(Q2)>G2(Q1). Under these
circumstances, interest group 1 obviously supports candidate 1 and interest group 2
supports candidate 2: L11=c1, L12=L21=0 and L22=c2. Using this ￿campaign contribution
specialization theorem￿ [ cf. Magee et al. (1989), p. 60]  and the contest success function
(1), the objective functions (2) of the two interest groups can be written as follows:
      [] 1 2 1 1
2 1
1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( c Q G s
c c
c
c Q G Q G Q G c Q G Q G V − +
+
= − + − = − − + = π π π
      [] 2 2 2 2
2 1
1
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( c Q G s
c c
c
c Q G Q G Q G c Q G Q G V − +
+
−
= − + − − = − − + = π π π
where  s1 and s2 denote the contest stakes of the interest groups: s1=G1(Q1)-G1(Q2) and








































c = . Substituting this result back in either one of the above first-































To simplify the exposition, assume now the quadratic utility functions G1=(Q-1)
2 and
G2=δQ
2 with δ>0  (cf. Figure 1). Substitution of G1=(Q-1)
2 and G2=δQ
2 in the expression
given for π  in equation (4) results in
(5a)
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Since Q1 and Q2 appear in this expression always in the form Q1+Q2, the iso-π  lines have
a slope of minus unity in the policy-pronouncement space Q2/Q1 (increasing Q2 by ε  and
decreasing Q1 also by ε  leaves π  unaltered).6
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Inspection of equation (5a) reveals that close to the point (0,0) the probability π of the
first candidate￿s winning the election is almost one, whereas close to point (1,1) it is
almost zero. Moving through the policy-pronouncement space Q2/Q1 in a north-easterly
direction thus reduces π. For δ=1, the negatively sloped π=‰-line passes through the
point of complete polarization (Q1,Q2)=(0,1) as depicted in Figure 2. If, however, δ≠ 1, then
complete polarization does not result in an equal chance of electoral success. In Figure
3, which is based on the assumption δ>1, candidate 1 has a smaller chance of winning at
the platform combination (0,1) than candidate 2, i.e. π(0,1)<1/2.
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Consider first the case δ=1 (cf. Figure 2). There are three Nash equilibria: (Q1,Q2)=(0,0),
(0,1), and (1,1). All these platform combinations lie on the π=‰-locus; in each of these
equilibria the two candidates thus have a 50% chance of winning the election. The
figure nicely illustrates that neither candidate can increase his probability of winning by
choosing another policy platform as long as the opponent remains at the respective
equilibrium position. Moving away from Q2=0 does, for example, not pay for candidate
2: between 0 and 1 his probability of winning 1- π is smaller than one half, and at Q2=1 it
does not exceed one half.
Notice, that in the case δ>1 (cf. Figure 3), the point (0,0) is not a Nash equilibrium
anymore, since candidate 2 can announce the policy Q2=1 which, combined with Q1=0,
increases his probability of election 1-π : 1-π(0,0)=‰<1-π(0,1). The point (0,1), however, is
not a Nash equilibrium either, since candidate 1 can now duplicate the policy of his
opponent to obtain a 50% chance of winning: π(1,1)= ‰>π(0,1). The only global Nash
equilibrium is the point (1,1).2
We thus arrive at the conclusion that political polarization as an equilibrium
phenomenon emerges only if δ=1. The political-polarization equilibrium is thus
structurally unstable and we are led to conclude that the ￿vanilla￿ model does not allow
for political polarization. To generate polarized equilibria that  resemble the political
cleavages observed in the real world, one needs to throw some sand into the well-oiled
political mechanism portrayed in this model. The requisite changes that have been
proposed in the literature refer, technically speaking, to the equilibrium concept, the
strategy set, the payoffs, and the rules of the game. We will discuss these changes one
after the other.
                                               
2 For symmetry reasons, (0,0) is the unique Nash equilibrium in the case δ<0.8
3.  The Equilibrium Concept
To allow for political polarization, an equilibrium concept has been proposed that takes
history into account [ cf. Hillman and Ursprung (1988)] .  The basic idea is the following.
Assume that candidates belong to established political parties and thus cannot choose
freely any platform they may want to adopt. They rather need to take the established
party line into account and can, in their attempt to maximize or minimize π, deviate
from the inherited party-line only in small steps. Under these circumstances the
candidates￿ behavior can be portrayed with a so-called ￿gradient system￿: the
candidates move in the policy-pronouncement space in that direction which maximizes
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where dQi/dt denotes the change over time t, and the positive parameter κ  measures the
speed with which the candidates can adopt changes in established policy stances. Since













π     (i=1,2)
(cf. equation 5 with δ=1), we have  0 2 1 < − = Q Q   . While the first candidate marginally
adjusts her platform by reducing Q1 (i.e. by moving down in the policy-pronouncement
space depicted in Figure 4), candidate 2 increases Q2 by exactly the same amount (i.e. he
moves to the right). Starting out from any platform combination (Q1,Q2) except (0,0) and
(1,1) [where the partial derivatives of π (Q1,Q2) are not defined, but unilateral marginal
deviations do not pay] small policy adjustments will eventually bring about a complete
polarization in policy pronouncements as indicated by the arrows in Figure 4.9
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The platform combination (Q1,Q2)=(0,1) is thus a local Nash equilibrium embedded in a
basin of attraction of the underlying dynamic (gradient) system. Notice, that at Q1=0
(Q2=1) candidate 1 (candidate 2) cannot improve her probability of election anymore by
making policy adjustments and thus leaves her platform unaltered. Moreover, notice
that the point (0,1) is the only (local) Nash equilibrium which is embedded in a basin of
attraction. To be sure, complete policy convergence at (1,1) continues to represent a
global Nash equilibrium, but this Nash equilibrium lacks dynamic stability if the
candidates behave the way we assumed.
As mentioned above, the economic justification for this choice of equilibrium concept is
that a political party cannot choose its election platform without regard to its traditional
political stance, and a candidate running for public office is, to some extent, tied to the
traditional policy stance of the party which supports her. There exist at least two reasons
for these constraints. First, the party machine needs to be persuaded of major policy
adjustments. This will take time and effort since information is filtered through
ideological convictions. Second, the clientele interest groups need to be informed and
their confidence needs to be gained, which - for credibility and reputational reasons -
may be difficult if not impossible if the proposed policy change is substantial.3 For these
reasons the inherited party stance is usually changed only marginally, implying that the
outcome will (almost always) converge towards complete political polarization in the
above setup.
                                               
3 Mayer (1998), in a standard probabilistic voting model, also employs reputation effects to generate
political polarization.10
The behavior of the model analyzed above crucially depends on the convexity of the
interest groups￿ utility functions. Using, for example, the concave functions G1=1-Q
2 and
G2=1-(1-Q)
2 (cf. Figure 5) yields a strikingly different result.
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If we substitute these utility functions in the expression given for π in equation 4, we
obtain
(5b)    
2
2 1 Q Q +
= π
Even though this specification  does not change the shape of the iso-π  lines as compared
to the scenario with the convex utility functions, platform combinations in a
neighborhood of (0,0) are now associated with a probability  π  close to zero and platform
combinations in a neighborhood of (1,1) with a probability π  close to unity. Moving in
the policy pronouncement space Q2/Q1 in a north-easterly direction, π  now increases! As
a consequence, the direction of the small adjustments in policy pronouncements is
reversed, and Figure 6 reveals that the outcome is now complete political convergence
at  (Q1,Q2)=( ‰,‰). Notice that this outcome, in contrast to the complete-polarization
equilibrium derived for convex utility functions, is a ￿straight￿ Nash equilibrium.11
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4.  The Strategy Set
Policy reversals are costly in terms of party-internal persuasion and external credibility
and  reputation. These costs can, in principle, also be modeled by restricting the strategy
set of the politicians. This is the approach taken by Magee et al. (1989, chapter 9) who
assume in their endogenous trade-policy model that one candidate caters for the import-
competing interests and thus has to propose an import tariff, and the other candidate
caters for the export-industry interests and thus needs to announce an export subsidy.4
Somewhat less restrictive is the approach taken in Hillman and Ursprung (1993a) where
it is assumed that a candidate with a protectionist background cannot propose free trade
and a candidate with a liberal trade policy background cannot announce autarky. In the
situation depicted in Figure 3 this means that the candidates￿ strategy sets are restricted
to  [ 0,1) and (0,1] , respectively, implying that the feasible policy-pronouncement space
Q2/Q1 consists of the whole triangle with the exception of the corners at (0,0) and (1,1).
Needless to say, one could just as well change the contest success function in such a
way that convergence at the extremes does not pay for the politician whose party
background is not in line with the respective policy, i.e. one could define π(0,0)=1 and
π(1,1)=0. However, we prefer to associate changes in the payoffs with candidate
objectives which transcend the maximization of electoral success.
                                               
4 To obtain reasonable upper bounds for the proposed policies, these authors employ a somewhat more
complex contest success function in which the probability of election depends not only on the campaign
expenditures but also on the candidates￿  policy pronouncements.12
5.  Payoffs I: Income Maximization
The concave utility functions depicted in Figure 5 give rise to political concordance (cf.
Figure 6), implying that the interest groups have no reason to provide campaign
contributions. The lobbying equilibrium is thus characterized by a platform combination
which does not induce any lobbying. This is clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs and
we are again confronted with the problem of driving some kind of wedge between the
policy pronouncements.5 One way of doing so is by assuming that the candidates do not
maximize the probability of being elected to public office but rather their personal
income. This is the approach taken in Ursprung (1990) where the first candidate￿s
expected utility is specified as
(3b) a a p Y c Y c Y Y U + + ∆ = + − + = ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 α π π α π π
Yp denotes the salary associated with elected office and Ya the candidate￿s income in her
best alternative occupation. In addition to the income Yp, the successful candidate is able
to appropriate a rent which varies positively with the elected official￿s political support
as measured by the contributions c1 to her campaign. Political support is thus not only
valued for electoral reasons but also since it can potentially be converted into income.6
Notice, that this specification does not imply that the candidate directly appropriates
funds from his war chest;7 we rather use the size c1 of the war chest as an indicator of
the first candidate￿s income-relevant political support. The second candidate￿s utility U
2
is specified analogously.
Using the concave utility functions G1=1-Q
2 and G2=1-(1-Q)
2 introduced in the previous
section, the campaign contributions collected by candidate 1 amount to (cf. equation 4)
) 2 )( ( ) (
4
1
2 1 1 2
2
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Substituting this expression and  the result π=(Q1+Q2)/2 obtained for the second
(lobbying) stage of the game (cf. equation 5b) into the objective function (3b), we arrive
at
                                               
5 Poole and Romer (1985) already observed that modeling policy-induced campaign contributions is not a
trivial task.
6 This kind of utility function has first been used by Appelbaum and Katz (1987) in a lobbying model
which does, however, not focus on electoral competition.
7 Glazer and Gradstein (2001) assume that the candidates steal from their war chests and Pan and Shieh
(2002) assume that service-induced contributions are completely appropriated by the candidates.13
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Differentiating the first candidate￿s utility function with respect to her instrument
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Since our model is perfectly symmetric, we need not derive the reaction function of
candidate 2; we rather use the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium, the distance between
a candidate￿s policy pronouncement Qi and the bliss point of his or her constituency (0
or 1, as the case may be) is the same for each candidate: Q2=1-Q1. Using this symmetry
















2 . The candidates￿ equilibrium policy pronouncements thus depend on the ratio
of the income difference ∆ Y=Yp-Ya and the parameter α  which measures to what extent
political support can be converted in private income. Since Q1 cannot become negative,
































































































If the salary difference ∆Y=Yp-Ya is sufficiently high or, alternatively, if the
appropriation parameter α  is sufficiently low, political concordance (Q1=Q2=‰) is
maintained despite the change in candidate preferences (cf. Figure 7). If, however,
public office is relatively unattractive as far as the salary (including ego-rent) is
concerned, or the conversion of political support into personal income is relatively easy,
political polarization will occur (Q1<‰, Q2>‰).
Conversion of political support into personal gain can be accomplished in a perfectly
legal manner. After all, the candidates commit to their policy platforms without any
preceding arrangements with their clientele interest groups. Since, however, a politician14
who indulges in the requisite activities deserts his voters and his party by trading off
election prospects for personal gain, one may well speak of personal corruption.
  1
            ￿     Q2
Figure 7  ‰
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6.  Payoffs II: Ideological Objectives
Personal gain can induce politicians to deviate from a strategy of maximizing electoral
success. In this section it is shown that following ideological objectives can have the
same effect. Consider the following objective function U1 of candidate 1 and let U2 be
specified analogously:
(3c) [] π δ π γ π δ ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 1 − + − + = Q W Q W U
Wi(Q) denotes the ideological utility that candidate i derives from the implemented
policy Q. Furthermore, assume - for simplicity - that the first candidate has the same
utility function as the first interest group, i.e. W1(Q)=G1(Q)=1-Q
2 and, analogously,
W2(Q)=G2(Q)=1-(1-Q)
2. We have already solved the second-stage game played by the
interest groups, i.e. we know that  π=(Q1+Q2)/2 (cf. equation 5b). Anticipating the interest
groups￿ reaction, the first candidate thus maximizes
12 12 12
11 1 1 2 () 1 () ( 1 )
22 2
QQ QQ QQ
UW Q W Q δγ δ
 ++  +  =+ −+ −   	
 




) 1 ( ) ( 2 1
2
2











Q Q Q Q Q
Q
U
Again we use the symmetry condition to compute the equilibria. Substituting Q2=1-Q1 in
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For which parameter combinations (γ ,δ ) will the two policy pronouncements converge
at Q1=Q2=‰ ? Setting the expression on the right hand side of the above equation equal to
‰, we obtain after some standard manipulations
2 3 2 5







The Q1=Q2=‰ line defined by this equation is depicted in Figure 8.8 For δ =0 we have U1=π
and we are back to the ￿vanilla￿ model discussed in section 1 (cf. equation 3c). Since
we used the concave utility functions depicted in Figure 5, we know from section 2 that
the equilibrium is characterized by a complete convergence of the two platforms in the
sense of Hotelling and Downs. Below the Q1=Q2=‰ line we thus have complete political
convergence.
δ 414 . 0 1 2 1 ≈ − = Q   
4
1 1 = Q
1
Figure 8 4/5 polarization: Q1<‰, Q2>‰
‰
complete convergence
           Q1=Q2=‰
         1 γ
Let us now look at the special case δ =1. In this case the candidates have, at least to some
extent, extra-electoral motivations. In the case of γ=1 - a specification which is similar to
the one proposed by Wittman (1983) - the candidates￿ objectives are completely
dominated by ideological considerations; their utility equals the expected utility of the
implemented policy with no consideration whatsoever to who is actually implementing
the policy. Under these circumstances political convergence certainly does not represent
an equilibrium since deviating from a common platform improves the outcome with a
positive probability, while the less favorable outcome corresponds to the certain
outcome of the status quo. Substituting δ =γ =1 into (6) yields Q1=… and thus Q2=￿.
In the case of γ=0, the politicians are, in the first place, interested in being elected to
public office; if elected, they do, however, derive utility from pursuing a policy which
corresponds to their ideological convictions. Deviating from a back-to-back position in
the sense of Hotelling and Downs increases the deviating candidate￿s utility in terms of
                                               
8 Notice that δ  converges to ‰ if γ  approaches unity. This can be seen by applying  l￿H￿pital￿s rule:









ideology, but decreases her utility in terms of popularity. Because of this additional cost
of deviation the candidates￿ platforms are less polarized using this specification due to
Edelman (1992) as compared to the situation portrayed by Wittman￿s specification γ=1.9
Indeed, substituting δ =1 and γ =0 into (6) yields  414 . 0 1 2 1 ≈ − = Q >0.25 and thus
586 . 0 2 2 2 ≈ − = Q <0.75.
7.  The Rules of the Game: Corruption
As compared to personal corruption, official corruption implies an agreement between a
candidate and an interest group to exchange, in case of the candidate￿s election,
favorable policies for campaign contributions. In contrast to the policy-induced
contributions analyzed in the previous sections, the contributions analyzed here are
service-induced. To portray political polarization in an environment of service-induced
contributions, i.e. in an environment in which official corruption is prevalent, it suffices
to assume one type of interest group only [cf. Baron (1989) and Wilson (1990)]. We
thus assume that there are n identical interest groups, all of them possessing the utility
function G(Qj), where Qj denotes a policy targeted at interest group j. A suitable example
would be an industry-specific import tariff. If the two candidates are in a strong position
vis-￿-vis the n interest groups, they can extract from them the expected value of the
proposed policy; hence
(7) 11 2 2 () ( 1 ) ()
ee
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9 Just as Magee et al. (1989), Edelman uses a contest success function which includes the candidates￿
policy pronouncements. This allows her, first, to restrict the analysis to only one interest group and,
second, to consider a setup in which the interest group contributes before the politicians choose their
platforms. Gersbach (1998) analyzes a similar model with many interest groups (donors).
10 Notice, that the ￿campaign contribution specialization theorem￿ does not apply anymore to this
modeling setup. The interest groups make contributions to both candidates. Morton and Cameron (1992)
point out, however, that the stronger candidate could do better by rewarding only those interest groups
who do not contribute also to her opponent. They go on to show that such a restriction has devastating
consequences for this modeling approach.18
Both candidates are thus assumed to possess the same objective: they want to be
elected, but the value Wi of winning the election is assumed to decrease with increasing
(average) concessions to the interest groups. From a technical point of view, this
objective function is identical to the specification γ =0 and δ =1 analyzed in the previous



























W  is the same for both
politicians, it is not supposed to reflect any ideological commitment on the part of the
politicians, but rather ￿the recognition that a higher level of Q lessens political support
from the general interest, thereby shortening the expected time in office; or that a higher
Q increases the effort required by the politician to counteract political opposition...￿ [ cf.
Wilson (1990), p.244] .
To introduce a difference between the two competing politicians, assume now that the
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e)Qj2. Substitution of these expressions in (1) and the resulting









































If n is large, it is reasonable to assume that each interest group takes the expected
probability π
e as given. Candidate 1 can thus treat π
e parametrically when she chooses
Qj1. The best-response calculus of the first politician thus implies choosing Qj1 (for
j=1,...,n) such that U1 in the above equation is maximized for given values of Qj2 and π
e:







































































The second candidate solves an analogous maximization problem. For symmetry











































































In equilibrium, of course, the expected probability π
e needs to equal the actual
probability π . Setting π =π
e in the left part of (8a), we see that the condition is satisfied
for  π=0 as well as for π=1. For π ≠ 1 we can cancel the term (1-π )n and obtain
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Interior solutions of π , i.e.  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ π , thus require Q2=βQ1. Since we want to focus on
solutions in which the election outcome is uncertain, we need to assume that this






































We thus, finally, arrive at the equilibrium policy pronouncement Q1  as an implicit


























Plotting f(Q1, β )=0 reveals (cf. Figure 9) that Q1 converges to zero if the asymmetry in
election efficiency as measured by the parameter β  increases beyond all bounds.
Moreover, the plot shows that the extent of political polarization ∆Q=Q2-Q1 varies
positively with β . If the first candidate￿s campaign is much more efficient than the
campaign of her opponent, she is in such a strong position that she does not need to20
compromise her value W1 of being elected by making illegal deals with the interest
groups, whereas the weak second candidate￿s best option is to corrupt himself and to
buy a higher probability of winning, thereby reducing his value W2 of being elected.11
 Q2
Figure 9          Q1
      ∆ Q
        1        β
                                               
11 In this model the offer is made by the politician. In the ￿policy for sale￿ type of model advocated by
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996) it is the interest groups which are supposed to approach the
politicians. The corruption model designed by Grossman and Helpman is essentially a combination of
building blocks taken from the Wilson model and our vanilla model presented in section 2. The difference
between our vanilla model and the Grossman/Helpman model is that in the vanilla model the politicians
are the Stackelberg leaders whereas in the Grossman/Helpman model the interest groups act as
Stackelberg leaders and the politicians are the followers.21
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